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TOWARDS A POLARIZED FUTURE: 




 It is a well-known (and particularly topical) phenomenon that America’s youngest 
voters are also the least politically engaged age demographic, at least via formal 
mechanisms such as voting. Consequently, political science literature has broadly 
generalized young voters’ political interest. This thesis endeavors to introduce some 
nuance into our understanding of young voters. One common assumption is that young 
people are malleable in their political views; given what we know about life course 
changes, this is not an unfair assumption, but this malleableness is often conflated with 
having no strong opinions at all. Conversely, I argue that although young voters may 
change their attitudes over the course of their lives, they hold strong opinions even in 
their youth.  
Specific times may be particularly polarizing on the young voting populace. To 
study this, I analyze the ANES data of three election years in which the political context 
may have catalyzed young voters to the point of strong attitudes. I select specific 
variables that were particularly salient on each election (such as abortion in 1980, and 
racial issues in 2016), and examine whether young voters 1) felt strongly on these issues, 
and 2) were uniformly ideological or more polarized. I also compare young voters to 
older, less malleable age groups, to determine if current youth have experienced 
 
 vii 
polarization differently than other ages. In doing so, I find that young voters are not as 
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 In recent years, two aspects of American politics have occupied mainstream 
discussions: the ostensible extreme polarization possessing the nation, and young 
Americans’ role in driving modern politics. Both have been discussed at length amongst 
political pundits, political scientists, and increasingly, the public. However, the literature 
that examines their intersection has thus far been limited. 
 This blind spot may of course be due to classic political science thought of young 
people’s political behavior, which has held without major interruption for many decades; 
in fact, this understanding of young people has been fairly straightforward for the last 
nearly three-quarters of a century. It also conveniently aligns with common perceptions 
of young people among the public: young Americans are more liberal than their older 
counterparts, no matter what time period you look at (Jennings 1981); they are fairly 
impressionable and are significantly molded by their environments, but especially their 
families (Hyman 1959); and generally, these liberal young people tend to grow more 
conservative over time as a function of various life changes (Jennings 1981). Additional 
assessments of young Americans and their political socialization have found that while 
these truths generally hold, there are of course exceptions; for example, Jennings (1987) 
finds that individuals who partook in anti-Vietnam War protests maintained liberal 
tendencies throughout their lives, at higher rates than people who did not participate in 
protests in their youth. This leads Jennings to conclude that the forces of social 




that has been supported by other scholarship (Whittier 1997; DeMartini 1983; Jennings 
2002). However, this exception is just that: an exception. By and large, young Americans' 
political behavior and life course changes have been fairly predictable. 
 Alongside this consistency in American attitudes theorized by generational 
scholars rises a seemingly counterintuitive trend: America is also apparently becoming 
more polarized. Though respected authors have disputed this (Fiorina 2005; Fiorina 
2008), the consensus among scholars generally seems to be that more Americans are 
divided than ever before (Abramowitz 2008). If this is the case, the implications for our 
future are great. Specifically, this thesis posits that polarization is becoming both more 
pervasive and more extreme among this generation of younger voters than previous 
cohorts of younger voters. If this is true, then by our understanding of life course politics, 
this polarization will follow young Americans throughout their lives, molding a more 
polarized America for at least a generation. 
 However, this analysis is neither pro- nor anti-polarization; that is, it is not 
sounding an alarm over the insidiousness of polarization, nor does it intend to downplay 
the seriousness of a polarized society. The consequences of polarization can be dire, both 
within our institutions and within our personal lives. Polarization is known to lead to 
legislative gridlock and, increasingly, interpersonal hostility. Though these consequences 
are unfortunate, they are not inherent to polarization. Other changes rather than reversing 
polarization may be appropriate to counteract them (such as systems of proportional 
representation, or learning to work and live with those of polar opposite ideological 




should not necessarily be taken as a warning to take all measures to combat polarization, 
but merely as an objective assessment of the current state and future of polarization in the 
United States, for those with vested interest in this trend. 
 This analysis consists of a review of extant literature regarding theories of 
political socialization; the history of polarization in America; and what has been said to 
date about current young Americans, who are undergoing the process of political 
socialization in this polarized context. It also contributes to the literature by putting forth 
an original data analysis, as well as a discussion of the results of this analysis. 
 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses posed by this thesis are as follows: 
 
The Cohort Hypothesis: Millennials and Generation Z have experienced their political 
coming of age in a unique context (i.e., greater polarization and partisan sorting in the 
general electorate, further compounded by social media and the 24/7 news cycle). Thus, it 
is expected that current young voters will already have strong opinions on the most 
pressing issues of today, and will present attitudes on both extremes–liberal and 
conservative–of topical issues. This will be unlike previous years, in which these factors 
of political socialization were not present or as strong as they are now. 
 
The Generation Hypothesis: Not only will these forces lead to a cohort which is more 




theories of lifespan persistence, current older generations will be less polarized than the 
young people they are raising. More simply put, it is hypothesized that the younger a 
person is, the more polarized they are. 
 
With these hypotheses in mind, we now turn to the data and methods with which they 
will be tested. 
Data and Methods 
The data analyzed for the purpose of this research include several variables from 
multiple years of the American National Election Studies (ANES). Some of these 
variables were reconstructed to measure the magnitude–rather than the direction, as was 
the case in the original variables–of the responses. This was done because this analysis is 
interested in extremeness of attitudes, not only direction. Several bivariate and 
multivariate regressions have been conducted of age on these measures of extremeness in 
multiple years, seeking to conclude if age played a significant role in level of 
extremeness in any year. Additional analyses were also conducted in order to verify these 
findings. 
 Of course, an important clarification to also be addressed is that extremeness does 
not necessarily equate to polarization. For example, an analysis that determines that 
young people's views have become more extreme may just be capturing an increase in 
extremely liberal views, which does not suggest polarization. Although the extremeness 




which are found to be significant are reexamined to ensure this is not actually due to a 
one-sided increase in extremeness. 
 A greater discussion of data and methods takes place in the Original Research 
portion of the paper. For now, we turn to the literature review, in which current 










 Two main strands of political science literature are relevant to this analysis: 
current theories of young Americans and their political socialization, and discussions of 
supposed American polarization. The small amount of literature which considers the 
intersection thereof will also be discussed. To begin, we first look to where political 
science stands on the process of political socialization and how it is undertaken in the 
United States. 
 The study of political socialization is relatively new. Perhaps the first seminal 
work in political science regarding young people and their political socialization is 
Herbert Hyman's 1959 book Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of 
Political Behavior. In it, Hyman defines political socialization as the process by which 
individuals form three dimensions: political participation and involvement, radical or 
conservative goals, and democratic or authoritarian tendencies. This thesis is interested in 
this second aspect of political socialization: the process by which individuals form the 
direction and strength of their political ideology. 
Hyman conducts several investigations into the attitudes of children and young 
adults, seeking to determine what influence bears the most impact on the process of their 
political socialization. He overwhelmingly finds that parents and family are the most 
influential factor, more than school or peer groups. This finding has been reasserted by 




For over 60 years, then, political scientists have agreed family is the single 
biggest influence on a person's political socialization. It is with this in mind that Jennings 
and Niemi conducted their 1974 panel study of American high school students and their 
parents. This study went on to become their book, Generations and Politics (1981). In it, 
Jennings and Niemi relay the findings of their two-wave study, consisting of interviews 
of students and their parents twice over the span of eight years. Though the book has its 
origins in this study of parental effects on children's political socialization, it expands into 
a discussion of stability and change in life-span political orientations.  
What Jennings and Niemi find is that the trajectory of an individual's politics is 
not as straightforward as either enduring stability or perpetual change. Rather, they 
conclude that “moderate stability is likely to characterize most of the population on most 
political attributes,” but that “the potential for change in adulthood is great throughout the 
population” (380). Generational politics scholars have still not decisively concluded 
whether stability or change (or some concrete combination thereof) is the rule, but 
Jennings and Niemi's conclusion has formed the basis of much of the study of 
generational politics since. 
Jennings went on to add some nuance to these findings with his 1987 paper, 
“Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest Generation.” Here, he 
expands upon the circumstances in which stability may be the case over change and vice 
versa. Specifically, Jennings finds that among members of the Protest Generation, those 
who partook in the anti-Vietnam War protests of the 1960s and 1970s or were otherwise 




sustain liberal leanings throughout their lives. Most of the Protest Generation cohort had 
held these liberal leanings during their youth. However, non-participants' beliefs 
generally grew more conservative over time, as Jennings and Niemi had first observed in 
1981. 
These updates to our understanding of life-course politics have been verified 
since, even as recently as Earl et al's 2017 piece “Youth, activism, and social 
movements.” What this literature has grown to show is that social movements are 
increasingly shaping young people's political participation. The United States has not 
suffered from a lack of social movements in recent years. From Black Lives Matter to the 
Pro-life and Pro-choice Movements, there are countless efforts with which young 
Americans can align themselves. In Generations and Politics, Jennings and Niemi write 
that fora like newspapers or television news are not nearly as impactful as parents on 
political socialization, because they only provide for passive, rather than active, 
involvement (33). However, since the time of their writing, the media available to young 
people has grown in use and capability. Specifically, social media now provides a forum 
with which users can actively engage.  
The effects of social movements' usage of social media on political socialization 
have not been studied to the extent that parents and family have been, but there is a 
burgeoning literature there (see Loader et al 2014 and Xenos et al 2014 for examples). 
Nonetheless, from what we currently know, it can be surmised that social media–and 
specifically, social movements' recruitment of young people through it–is constructing 




are immense. The majority of American adults now use at least one form of social media, 
especially those aged 18-29 (Pew Research Center 2019). This is an incredible amount of 
young people potentially being exposed to ideologically charged rhetoric, from 
movements and organizations to politicians and pundits. Because social media are such 
active fora, it is also likely that more young Americans than ever can be considered 
participants in these movements: both liberal ones, as studied by Jennings in 1987, but 
conservative ones as well. If this is the case, then more people than ever may undergo the 
socialization described by Jennings, in which their attachment to their extreme beliefs 
continues throughout life rather than undergoing the expected liberal-to-conservative 
bend. 
This all leads us to conclude that an even more polarized future lies ahead; but of 
course, this is only the case if these factors are actually making young people more 
polarized right now. Before we deduce if that is the case, we first discuss the current 
status of polarization in America. 
In any discussion of polarization, it first must be clear exactly what we mean by 
this term. Definitions in political science vary, but the first that comes to mind is likely 
increasing distance across policy space. In lay terms, people's policy preferences (be it 
those of the public, politicians, activists, etc.) are moving farther and farther from the 
middle of the policy space. Essentially, there are fewer and fewer issues on which people 
of opposing ideologies even somewhat agree. Another definition of polarization ignores 
policy stances in favor of outgroup attitudes, suggesting polarization is the trend in which 




group just for their membership in said group (Iyengar, Konitzer, and Tedin 2018). Either 
is a valid conceptualization of polarization, as are many others. However, this thesis will 
conduct its analyses with the assumption that polarization is a widening gap among the 
public in their policy preferences. 
The scholarship that addresses the question of an increasingly polarized American 
public is plentiful. Countless news articles, op-eds, and pundit musings lead much of the 
American public to assume that polarization is undoubtedly here (and here to stay). 
However, the literature has historically presented a more mixed perspective. Political 
scientists have offered conflicting accounts of polarization, ranging from it being a 
fabricated concern to it being one of the most urgent problems facing the American 
polity. Perhaps most notably an example of the former, Fiorina (2005) calls American 
polarization a “myth,” and writes that even most 21st century Americans “are not very 
well-informed about politics, do not hold many of their views very strongly, and are not 
ideological” (19). Reactions to this assertion–both supportive and critical–continue to 
generate conversations in political science. One of the strongest examples of a dissent 
towards Fiorina lies in Abramowitz (2008), who rebukes Fiorina’s claim that polarization 
is limited only to a small swath of political elites. Rather, Abramowitz responds that 
polarization has increased among nearly all segments of the American electorate, 
especially those who are politically informed; Abramowitz also critically notes that this 
polarization has risen along with an increase of political knowledge and interest in the 




Abramowitz’s stance, or is at least predicated on the notion that it is correct (Persily 
2015; Graham and Svolik 2020). 
Though both political socialization and polarization have been explored 
extensively in the canon, the impact of the latter on the former has been neglected. Even 
more generally, polarization specifically among young Americans has not received 
adequate interest. This is despite the fear of growing polarization many people possess, 
and the very real potential young Americans have to proliferate it. The category “young 
people” can be (and has been) defined in numerous ways. For the purposes of this thesis, 
young Americans will consist of the two youngest named generations of which at least 
some members have attained voting age: colloquially, Millennials and Generation Zers. 
According to the Pew Research Center, Millennials are those born between 1981 and 
1996; thus, for the purposes of this thesis, “young people” are Americans aged 18-39 
(Dimock 2019). 
Iyengar, Konitzer, and Tedin (2018) briefly touch upon the impact of American 
polarization on political socialization, describing a mechanism by which polarization may 
beget greater polarization: research has shown Americans are increasingly marrying 
within their political ideologies, thus exposing any future children to an echo chamber of 
ideas. Then, these young people experience political socialization–on which parents are 
historically the single biggest influence–in an ideologically-salient environment, which 
has been shown to be most effective at producing strongly ideological individuals 




Clearly, the literature currently lacks much of anything in terms of political 
socialization in a polarized time, and even less about the future implications of it. This 







 This thesis seeks to determine if young people are more polarized than previous 
generations of younger people and current older generations (as discussed in the 
Generation and Cohort Hypotheses). In order to test these hypotheses, several bivariate 
regressions of age on various issue attitudes in multiple years were run. In addition to an 
initial regression of age on respondent ideological self-placement, the topics regressed 
upon in each year of analysis are: abortion opinion; attitudes towards increasing taxes to 
preserve the environment; and attitudes towards government aid of Blacks. Each of these 
issues were selected for their salience in each of these years, as well as their tendency to 
be deeply ideologically divided issues. More detailed justification for selection of these 
issues are provided within their respective analyses.  
When possible, the following years of ANES data were culled: 1984; 2000; and 
2016. The reasons for these years are threefold. Firstly, a logistics matter; this analysis is 
most effective when the same questions are analyzed in each year. Though many of the 
questions are stable throughout iterations of the ANES, each year does not necessarily 
have the same question as a prior year. Thus, these years were chosen when appropriate 
for their similarity in the relevant questions. Similarly, this analysis is interested in the 
effect of context on political socialization. A more robust discussion of context is possible 
when only three “contexts” (in this case, political eras) are specified. Thus, while a 
cumulative time series analysis of ANES data may be more appropriate for other 




years have several benefits. They are each four presidential terms apart–roughly half of a 
generation (Mannheim 1928); they are noted in the literature for their divisiveness; and 
each has been considered a breaking point towards a more polarized America. A brief 
justification of each year of analysis follows. 
The 1984 Election 
 Ten years in the wake of the Roe v. Wade decision, the 1984 election signaled a 
shift in the political orientation of the young people in this country. Unlike the Protest 
Generation before them, young people of the 1980s grew up under Reagan's 
conservatism. The 1984 election was also characterized by a rise in conservative 
Evangelicalism in the electorate, particularly among young people (Smidt 1987). Thus, 
contrary to general thought on political science which has believed young people to be 
more liberal than their older counterparts, in the early 1980s we observed a trend of them 
actually being more conservative. This provides for an interesting year of analysis, as 
much like our current times, political context was critical to adjusting political science's 
thought on young people and political socialization. 
The 2000 Election 
The selection of the year 2000 for analysis was a logistical matter. Because a 
time-series analysis was not entirely possible or appropriate here, 2000 offered a suitable 
middle-ground midway between the two especially interesting election years, 1984 and 
2016. In this way, 2000 offered to us a skeletal way to observe temporal trends, rather 




2000 election occurred in the wake of Bill Clinton's influential presidency, who made 
great gains in the realm of campaigning to young people (White 2018). It was also one of 
the first to take place under the growing ubiquity of the Internet and social media, which 
have come to bear enormous influence on civic engagement and political socialization. 
The 2016 Election 
Although 2016 is an obvious selection, as the most recent presidential election 
year of ANES data available at the time of writing, its context is also integral to this 
thesis. The 2016 American presidential campaign was marked by strong ideology and 
divisive rhetoric, and was considered polarizing by virtually all definitions. These factors 
and its recentness make 2016 a natural year of analysis to determine if our polarized time 







The most natural place at which to look when testing if young people are more 
polarized is their self-professed ideology. Surely, if they align more with strong liberal or 
strong conservative ideologies than ever before, then this is reflected in the ANES reports 
of ideology. Despite this, for reasons to be explained, this may not actually be true. 
Nonetheless, we begin our analyses with bivariate regressions of age on ideological self-
placement. 
Each ANES in our years of analysis (1984, 2000, and 2016) offered respondents 
an opportunity to place themselves on a seven-point scale from 1, “extremely liberal” to 
7, “extremely conservative.” Although we are interested in the most extreme of these 
views, our first analysis consists of a bivariate regression of age on this ideology self-











This initial analysis seemingly confirms extant thought regarding age and ideological 
placements. In each year, age and conservative ideology possess a statistically significant 
positive relationship; that is, the older an individual was in any of these years of analysis, 
the more conservative they were expected to be. This relationship also appears to have 
grown stronger each year, as the R-squared value steadily increases in each year of 
analysis. As we will note again shortly, however, measuring polarization via ideology is 
different than measuring polarization as a function of individual ideological issues. Thus, 
though this first analysis agrees with the common story of life course politics and 
ideology, there may still be more to this story. 
 In order to conduct our analysis of interest, in each year the ideology self-
placement scales were recoded so that respondents who indicated themselves as 
extremely liberal; liberal; conservative; or extremely conservative (answers 1, 2, 6, 7 in 
each survey, respectively) were all labeled as 1, while any other responses (slightly 
liberal, moderate, slightly conservative, or “haven't thought much about this}) were 
labeled as 0. These recoded variables were named libcon[yearofanalysis]: libcon1984, 
libcon2000, and libcon2016. Effectively, these variables constitute a scale on which to 
measure average extremeness at any age. The closer an age's value of libcon to 1, the 
more extreme were respondents of this age's placement on the scale. Variables 
constructed for age in each year by removing NAs from the given age variables were then 
regressed upon libcon for each year of analysis. The results of these regressions are 










These results do not support either the Cohort or Generation Hypotheses. In fact, 
they potentially suggest the inverse: in 1984 and 2000, age does not seem to be an 
indicator of extremeness in self-reported ideology. Neither value is statistically 
significant at any conventional level of significance. In 2016, the statistically significant 
results indicated by *** (a = 0.001) suggest that age and extremeness now actually have a 
positive relationship; that is, the older an individual, the higher their ideological 
extremeness. This contrasts with the Cohort Hypothesis, which expects age to have a 
more significant negative relationship in 2016 than in prior years; it instead has a more 
significant positive relationship. These results also contradict the Generation Hypothesis, 
which expects a significant negative relationship between age and ideological 
extremeness in 2016–a relationship of which we find the opposite. 
Although this analysis cannot be taken as support for either hypothesis, it is also 
not discouraging. This is because, much like party identity, Americans are historically 
reluctant to label themselves as an ideologue, or they do not realize that their views 
actually place them in such a category (Keith et al 1992). Thus, it may be more beneficial 
to look to other measures of ideology. To do so, we now look at three variables, each 
topical and ideologically charged. Respondents who were unwilling to admit to or 
unaware of their alignment with an ideology (liberal or conservative) may find 
themselves holding strongly liberal or conservative positions on these issues. 
Furthermore, younger Americans are the least likely to be cognizant of what party or 
ideology best reflects their views; thus, it is also possible that young Americans have 




To better examine ideological extremeness, then, we look to three ideologically divisive 
issues. Before we do so, though, we observe the relationship between age and a related 
concept: partisan extremeness. 
Partisanship 
 Like ideology, partisanship may not be the most helpful indicator of true opinion 
extremeness among Americans. This is particularly true for young Americans, who are 
least likely to identify with a party (CIRCLE). Nonetheless, it would be remiss to not at 








Despite concerns that examining age and partisanship may invalidate the hypotheses 
proposed by this thesis, we actually find that the predictive power of age on party 
affiliation is decreasing (R2 = 0.02 in 1984, versus R2 = 0.008 in 2016). Although the 
relationship between age and partisan extremeness is still positive–meaning the older an 
American is, the more likely they are to identify as a strong or weak Democrat or 
Republican–this relationship has weakened. Substantively, being older does not 
necessarily mean having stronger party ties than younger people anymore. This could be 
because younger people are now more partisan, or because older people are distancing 
themselves from parties, but either way, this brief foray into age and party extremeness 
actually may support the Cohort Hypothesis. 
While this examination of party extremeness and age has advantaged our 
hypotheses, we are still most interested in issue opinion extremeness and age. The first of 
these issues we will look at is abortion in the United States. 
Abortion Attitudes 
 Since the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade in 1973, abortion has been one of the 
most polarizing issues in America. Some scholars have even declared it the single most 
(and according to some authors, the only truly) polarizing debate (DiMaggio et al 1996; 
Abramowitz 1995; Carmines and Stimson 1980). However, more recent analyses have 
found that in general, American attitudes on abortion have been moving to the left–that 
is, from moderate positions to liberal ones, and from conservative positions to moderate 
ones (Mouw and Sobel 2001). This justifies the choice of abortion attitudes as a reference 




and young people have always leaned towards the liberal positions on this topic. Thus, 
any polarization found among young people is contrary both to trends in the American 
populace at large and the historical leanings of young Americans. 
With this in mind, our second set of analyses consists of another regression of 
age, this time on extremeness in abortion attitudes. In all three years of interest–1984, 
2000 and 2016–respondents were asked to identify which of four statements regarding 
abortion they felt best described their opinion. These statements were the same in each 
year, and were phrased as follows: 
1: By law, abortion should never be permitted. 
2: The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the 
woman's life is in danger. 
3: The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to 
the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. 
4: By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of 
personal choice. (ANES) 
 
For this analysis, the abortion variable was recoded in each year such that 
ideologically extreme responses (statements 1 and 4) were relabeled as 1, and less 
extreme positions (statements 2 and 3) were relabeled as 0. This created a scale from 0 
(displaying no ideologically extreme positions) to 1 (displaying only ideologically 




attitude extremeness variables in each year of analysis. The results of this analysis are 









These results suggest strong support for the Generation Hypothesis, and somewhat 
support the Cohort Hypothesis. Firstly, we observe that the relationship between age and 
ideological extremeness in abortion attitude is both negative and statistically significant 
(a = 0.001). Substantively, for every one year increase in age in 2016, a person's abortion 
attitude extremeness decreases by 0.002 (on a scale from 0 to 1). Thus, 18-year-old 
Americans are on average expected to have abortion attitudes of extremeness 0.654, 
while 80-year-old Americans are on average expected to have abortion attitudes of 
extremeness 0.530. While this illustration does indeed suggest that Americans regardless 
of age are more likely to have an extreme opinion than a non-extreme opinion, it also 
demonstrates what the data show: younger Americans are much more extreme in their 
abortion attitudes than older Americans in 2016. The statistically significant relationship 
lends its support to the Generation Hypothesis, which would expect a significant negative 
relationship between age and abortion attitude extremeness in 2016. 
The results generated by these regressions also somewhat support the Cohort 
Hypothesis, which expects a more significant negative relationship between age and 
extremeness in 2016 than in prior years. We instead find that the relationship between 
age and abortion attitude extremeness is significantly negative in all three years; 
however, it is most significant in 2016, as indicated by its greater R-squared value. 
Of course, the R-squared values generated here also indicate that though age is a 
significant influence on extremeness of abortion opinion, it is far from the most important 
(or even one of the most important). Age only explains about 0.3% of variation in 




interested in abortion opinion, per se; rather, it seeks to show that ideological 
extremeness varies by age, something this relationship certainly demonstrates. 
Conservation Attitudes 
Another issue area which has grown increasingly divisive in recent years is the 
environment. While the introduction of the Green New Deal into Congress falls outside 
the years of analysis here, its existence (and opposition) reflects the growing divide 
amongst Americans and their belief in climate change. 
Unfortunately, because of the recentness of its introduction into the political 
mainstream, questions about environmental policy attitudes are not yet ubiquitous in the 
ANES. The implications of this for our data are twofold: firstly, there are no relevant 
environmental questions present in the 1984 ANES. 1990 is instead used as our first year 
of analysis, as it is the earliest year in which any explicitly environmental policy-related 
question is posed. Secondly, environmental questions have not yet been standardized. 
This means that the question chosen to analyze environmental policy opinion 
extremeness in 2000 and 2016 was not asked in 1990, so a model with all three years 
cannot be constructed. Instead, two models were created, one with a regression of only 
1990 and its most relevant environmental policy question, and one with both 2000 and 
2016 and the identical environmental question posed in each. 
In 1990, respondents were asked if they would “support or oppose an increase in 
taxes that would be used to clean up the nation's air and water” (ANES). They were 
offered three possible responses: “Support,” “Oppose” and “Depends,” as well as the 




coded as 1; all others were coded at 0. Because there were only three formal options 
given to respondents, a follow up question regarding the strength of their admitted 
opinion was also included in the analysis, in order to account for the relative lack of 
variation in the prior question. This strengthens the validity of the analysis, by observing 
if responses to the tax increase question were strongly motivated (and thus likely 
ideological). Respondents who answered that they strongly supported or opposed this tax 
increase were coded as 1 (extreme), while all other answers were coded as 0. Table 5 










Model 1 represents the regression of age on extremeness of opinion regarding the 
potential environmental tax in 1990. Though it finds that age significantly impacts 
extremeness of environmental tax opinion, Model 2 undermines the legitimacy of Model 
1. Even though there is a significant relationship between age and opinion in Model 1, 
there is no corresponding relationship between age and the conviction behind those 
opinions in Model 2. What this suggests is that the responses analyzed in Model 1 may 
not have been ideological in nature; thus, we cannot conclude there is any relationship 
between age and environmental opinion extremeness in 1990.  
In 2000, respondents were given the opportunity to place themselves on an 
ordinal scale of the importance of the environment versus the importance of jobs and 
standards of living. A reply of 1 indicated that the “environment is much more 
important,” while a reply of 7 indicated that “jobs are much more important” (ANES). In 
2016, respondents were asked a similar question about an environment-jobs trade-off; a 1 
in 2016 meant that we should “regulate business to protect the environment and create 
jobs,” and a 7 meant “no regulation because it will not work and will cost jobs.” 
Responses of 1 and 7 were recoded as 1 to represent extremeness of opinion in both 
years; all other responses were recoded as 0. Because of the similarity of these questions, 
2000 and 2016's respective models of age on environmental opinion are both included in 










This pair of models shows a positive relationship between age and extremeness of 
environmental opinion in 2000, a relationship that becomes negative in 2016. This trend 
is promising for both the Cohort and Generation Hypotheses, but unfortunately, neither 
relationship is statistically significant. Further research with perhaps more appropriate 
data may successfully uncover a relationship between age and environmental opinion 
polarization, but with these data, such a relationship is not evident. Taking into account 
both of the 1990 models as well as the 2000 and 2016 models, we fail to find a significant 
relationship between age and polarization in environmental opinions. However, this is not 
necessarily discouraging for our hypotheses. One possibility is that the environment is 
not as polarizing an issue in general as expected; another is that the questions analyzed 
here may not be the best representative of environmental opinion extremeness. For 
example, to return to the topical Green New Deal, public support or opposition to this 
policy may better represent current sentiment and whatever polarization may be present. 
Although it may certainly be a better metric, such an ambitious policy was not in the 
public eye in any of the years of analysis here. Whatever the case, for now we move on 
having not found evidence that polarization in environmental attitudes is more 





The last polarizing issue which we analyze is the matter of racial attitudes in 
America. Specifically, we analyze responses to the “aid to Blacks” question asked in the 
ANES in all three years of analysis. Race relations in America may be the longest-lasting 
polarized topic in the United States, and second in intensity only to abortion. The divisive 
racist rhetoric of Donald Trump unquestionably heightened the prevalence of this issue in 
advance of the 2016 election. 
In 1984, 2000, and 2016, ANES respondents were asked to place their beliefs on a 
scale from 1: “the government...should make every effort to improve the social and 
economic positions of Blacks and other minority groups” to 7: “the government should 
not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves” 
(ANES). The former represents a liberal view, while the latter represents a deeply 
conservative one. 
Once again, these responses were recoded to account for their extremeness: 
answers of 1, 2, 6, and 7 became 1s, and other responses were recoded as 0. Finally, age 
was regressed upon these new racial attitude extremeness variables in all three years of 








According to this analysis, the relationship between age and extremeness of racial 
attitudes was negative in all three source years; however, this relationship only became 
statistically significant in 2016. This suggests support for both the Cohort and Generation 
Hypotheses. If the Cohort Hypothesis was to be true in the case of racial attitudes, we 
would expect that the relationship between age and attitude extremeness would be more 
negative and significant in 2016 than in earlier years, which we do find. If the Generation 
Hypothesis is true in the case of racial attitudes, we should find a significant negative 
relationship between age and attitude extremeness; again, we find this to be true. 
Substantively, the younger an individual in 2016, the less likely they are to believe the 
government should offer economic help specifically to Black Americans (a liberal view), 
and the more likely they are to believe Black Americans should “help themselves” (a 
conservative view). 
 
Summary of Analyses 
 Thus far, we have examined the relationship between age and ideology, as well as 
extremeness of ideology; abortion beliefs; conservation opinions; and racial attitudes in 
three similarly divisive election years. We found support for our hypotheses in two of 
these: abortion beliefs, in which the data strongly supported the Generation Hypothesis 
and somewhat supported the Cohort Hypothesis, and racial attitudes, in which the data 
strongly supported both hypotheses. However, this thesis is interested in polarization, not 
general extremeness of attitudes. Thus, although we found support for our hypotheses in 




merely increasingly extreme liberal (or conservative) views. We perform these secondary 
analyses in the next section. 
 
Confirmation of Findings 
 Based on our previous regressions, we can confidently say that the younger an 
individual was in 2016, the more extreme their opinions on the right to an abortion or on 
government welfare to Black Americans or other minority groups were likely to be. In 
the case of the latter, this is unlike the two earlier years of analysis, in which no such 
relationship was detectable; in the case of the former, this relationship was detected, but 
was found to have become more significant in 2016 than the two earlier years. However, 
while this phenomenon of extremeness alone is noteworthy, this thesis seeks to find 
evidence of increasing extremeness on both ends of the ideological spectrum: 
polarization. 
 To do this, we employ two strategies. Firstly, we outright examine the 
relationships between age and our variables unfolded (i.e., without the conversion to 
extremeness variables). Secondly, we observe the raw data without any sort of 
manipulation. With these strategies, we can both descriptively and statistically confirm if 
our findings are polarization, or one-sided increases in extremeness. 
Abortion 
 From our initial analysis, we found strong support for the Generation Hypothesis, 




first look to the relationship between age and abortion opinion sans extremeness factor, 









In all three years of analysis, we find a negative relationship between abortion opinion 
and age. Because the ANES allows respondents to select from 1 (conservative 
perspective) to 4 (liberal perspective), a negative relationship indicates that in each year, 
the older a respondent was, the more conservative (less liberal) their responses were 
likely to be. This would then also suggest that the younger an individual, the more liberal 
their abortion opinions. However, in 2016, this negative relationship is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level of significance, unlike in 1984 and 2000. This 
suggests that the relationship between age and abortion opinion liberalness is no longer a 
straightforward negative relationship, and raises the possibility of polarization. To 
consider this more fully, we can examine the raw abortion opinion data among just young 
voters. The responses to the ANES abortion question are listed in Table 9, along with 







2 3 4: Always 
permitted 
1984 11.1 27.0 20.0 41.9 
2000 11.7 30.9 14.7 41.2 









Immediately, two related trends are evident. Firstly, the percentage of young people 
aligning themselves with either of the two middle positions (both of which state 
permissiveness towards abortions, 2 having stricter conditions than 3) is lowest in 2016. 
In 1984, 47% of people aged 17-39 placed themselves in one of these less extreme 
categories. This dropped to 45.6% in 2000 before dropping even more drastically to 
40.1% in 2016. Alongside this trend, the number of young people aligning with both the 
conservative and liberal positions increased; 2.9 points for the liberal position between 
1984 and 2000, and 4 points for the conservative. This observation, in conjunction with 
the indicators of statistical significance from the previous abortion regressions, provide 
support for the hypothesis that the increasing extremeness observed among young people 
is in fact due to increasing extremeness on both poles, at least on the topic of abortion. 
We now attempt to demonstrate the same dynamic within the topic of racial attitudes. 
Racial Attitudes 
 Utilizing the government aid to Blacks/minorities ANES prompt as a metric for 
racial attitudes, we found support for both the Generation and Cohort Hypotheses. Table 











Here, we find that the relationship between age and response to the ANES government 
aid to minorities question is statistically insignificant in 1984 and 2000, but becomes 
significant and positive in 2016. Unlike the matter of abortion, in which we found the 
reverse–age no longer indicated liberalness or conservatism in 2016–we observe that the 
younger a respondent was in 2016, the more liberal their stance on aid to minorities was 
likely to be. This is not a helpful observation for our hypotheses, although it is not 
necessarily condemnatory, either. As we did for abortion, we now observe the raw data 
strictly for young people on this question in 1984, 2000, and 2016. 
 
Table 11 
 1: Gov’t 
should help 
minorities 




1984 9.0 8.4 64.3 10.2 8.1 
2000 10.2 9.7 34.5 15.0 30.6 
2016 17.7 10.7 44.7 11.9 15.0 
 
The patterns for this topic are less straightforward than for abortion. We see that the 
number of young people occupying the middle, moderate stance fell drastically from 
64.3% in 1984 to 34.5% in 2000, but rose to 44.7% in 2016. The shift responsible for the 
fall in moderates in 2000 was a conservative one, as surprisingly, the percentage of young 




8.1% to 30.6%. However, while 2000 interestingly throws off any sense of a trend, we 
can note that between 1984 and 2016, the number of young people identifying with the 
moderate racial attitude stance fell while the number identifying with both the 
conservative and liberal positions grew. While perhaps not as supportive as the evidence 
of abortion extremeness, the racial attitude data do somewhat suggest increasing division 
is responsible for increasing extremeness, as opposed to an increase on one dimension. 
 
Education: A Control Variable 
 Thus far, we have found that on the issues of abortion access and government aid 
to minorities, young people are more polarized than current older generations and past 
cohorts of young Americans (to varying extents). While the relationships uncovered here 
are plausible as is, there is of course the possibility of a third causal variable. Age and 
level of education are naturally related; perhaps the effects of age seen here are not due to 
age in itself, but to years of education. With this in mind, a regression of age on abortion 
opinion extremeness was again conducted, this time controlling for years of education.1 
The results of this model are in Table 12.  
 
1 Only abortion x education was examined, as abortion was the most fruitful of the four variables in 











Unsurprisingly, this analysis found that years of education attained significantly and 
positively impacted abortion opinion extremeness. Additionally, controlling for education 
rendered age alone as an insignificant independent variable in two of the three years here, 
including 2016. Although this somewhat disconfirms both of our hypotheses, future 
analyses should examine this relationship to ensure extremeness truly equates to 





 This analysis has uncovered a surprising trend: at least on the topics of abortion 
and racial resentment, young people appear to be becoming more polarized, on the 
aggregate growing less moderate in either direction. This proves counterintuitive to most 
traditional thought of young people in American political science, which typically asserts 
that young people are generally more liberal on social issues in their youth than their 
older counterparts. This newfound polarization among young people, which appears to be 
less present (if at all) among older Americans, may be a result of the political context in 
which the current generation of young Americans is experiencing their political 
socialization. Further research may confirm this finding, as well as investigate other 
ideologically-charged issues beyond the ones examined here to determine whether this 
increasing polarization among young people is limited to these specific topics, or present 
in more realms than previously understood. There are many ways to answer the questions 
raised by this thesis; the strategies employed by this research are just scraping the 
surface. Another potential avenue for future research is examining the relationship of age 
with other definitions of polarization. One which I suspect may be particularly interesting 
is the role of age and affective polarization, a form of polarization in which members of a 
group share increasingly negative feelings towards members of outgroups, such as 
Democrats or Republicans giving each other cold ratings on feeling thermometers 
(Iyenger et al 2012). 
It is also expected that if the findings of this initial analysis hold true, then the 




individual and aggregate levels, by Jennings’s view of generational consistency. 
Widespread polarization will be the norm for the foreseeable future, and as more young 
people are exposed to social movements than ever before, the effects of that participation 
will also be more widespread–meaning the strong liberal attachments built from 
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